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ABSTRACT

Pereira, Anil L. Ph.D., Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Wright State
University, 2007. Role-based Access Control for Grid Data Resources in the Open Grid
Services Architecture - Data Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI).

Grid has emerged recently as an integration infrastructure for the sharing and
coordinated use of diverse resources in dynamic, distributed virtual organizations (VOs).
A Data Grid is an architecture for the access, exchange, and sharing of data in the Grid
environment. In this dissertation, role-based access control (RBAC) systems for
heterogeneous data resources in Data Grid systems are proposed. The Open Grid Services
Architecture - Data Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI) is a widely used framework for
the integration of heterogeneous data resources in Grid systems.
However, in the OGSA-DAI system, access control causes substantial
administration overhead for resource providers in VOs because each of them has to
manage the authorization information for individual Grid users. Its identity-based access
control mechanisms are severely inefficient and too complicated to manage because the
direct mapping between users and privileges is transitory. To solve this problem, (1) the
Community Authorization Service (CAS), provided by the Globus toolkit, and (2) the
Shibboleth, an attribute authorization service, are used to support RBAC in the OGSADAI system. The Globus Toolkit is widely used software for building Grid systems.
Access control policies need to be specified and managed across multiple VOs. For
this purpose, the Core and Hierarchical RBAC profile of the eXtensible Access Control
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Markup Language (XACML) is used; and for distributed administration of those policies,
the Object, Metadata and Artifacts Registry (OMAR) is used. OMAR is based on the ebusiness eXtensible Markup Language (ebXML) registry specifications developed to
achieve interoperable registries and repositories.
The RBAC systems allow quick and easy deployments, privacy protection, and the
centralized and distributed management of privileges. They support scalable,
interoperable and fine-grain access control services; dynamic delegation of rights; and
user-role assignments. They also reduce the administration overheads for resource
providers because they need to maintain only the mapping information from VO roles to
local database roles. Resource providers maintain the ultimate authority over their
resources. Moreover, unnecessary mapping and connections can be avoided by denying
invalid requests at the VO level. Performance analysis shows that our RBAC systems add
only a small overhead to the existing security infrastructure of OGSA-DAI.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Data Grid
Grid has emerged recently as an integration infrastructure for the sharing and
coordinated use of diverse resources in dynamic, distributed virtual organizations (VOs).
A Data Grid is an architecture for the access, exchange, and sharing of data in the Grid
environment. It provides a distributed system middleware that allows different
communities to access and share data, networks, and other resources in a controlled and
secure manner [1]. Data Grids facilitate the management of distributed heterogeneous
data. The burden of managing the operations is removed from the user. The collective
operations required are all managed by the system via a single sign-on and uniform
querying mechanism for the user. The motivation behind such a system is to address the
following considerations [2]: (1) Large data set size, geographic distribution of users and
resources, and computationally intensive analysis results in complex and stringent
performance demands that are not satisfied by any existing data management
infrastructure; (2) No integrating architecture exists that allows us to identify
requirements and components common to different systems and hence apply different

1

technologies in a coordinated fashion to a range of data-intensive large-scale application
domains. Current technology cannot easily handle these scenarios which require the
coordinated sharing of data and resources across multiple organizations. It either does not
accommodate the range of resource types or does not provide the flexibility and control
on sharing relationships [3].

Scientific and Business communities are increasingly collaborating, and this is
giving rise to the need for more sophisticated technologies for data and resource sharing.
Data Grids reduce hardware and software costs by enabling the secure exchange of
programs and data between collaborating organizations. Without a Data Grid, a separate
set of resources are purchased (and managed) in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) behind a
completely separate firewall. By using Data Grid technology, there is no need to build a
separate DMZ [4].

1.2 Motivation
User authorization is one of the most challenging issues in Data Grids. Current
authorization mechanisms cannot address all the issues that arise in dynamic Grid
environments which often encompass multiple organizations, each with its own security
policy [5]. Traditional means of security administration that involves manual editing of
policy databases or issuance of credentials cannot meet the demands of these dynamic
scenarios [6]. There will be a profound impact on the security of distributed systems by
using a Data Grid system. In traditional systems, the focus of security mechanisms has
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been to protect the system from its users and, in turn, to protect data maintained by the
system on behalf of each user. While such protection remains important for Data Grid
applications, Data Grids introduce the extra requirements of protecting applications and
user data from the systems on which parts of an application will execute [7]. Also,
traditional network security research has focused primarily on two-party client-server
interactions with relatively low performance requirements. Data Grid applications
frequently involve many more entities, impose stringent performance requirements and
involve more complex activities, such as collective operations and the downloading of
code [8].

The typical identity-based authorization used in Grids today is not scalable because
authorization information should be maintained for each user. In role-based access
control (RBAC) [9, 10] permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned
appropriate roles, thereby acquiring the roles’ permissions [11]. Hence, RBAC is quite
scalable since authorization information is associated with roles, not with individual
users. RBAC shows clear advantages over traditional access control models in Grid
environments, because it allows a uniform representation of diverse security policies and
ensures that no security violations occur during inter-domain accesses [5]. None of the
current access control systems in Grids provide comprehensive support for RBAC.

The Data Access and Integration Services Working Group (DAIS-WG) of the
Global Grid Forum (GGF) established standards for Grid interface to data resources [12].
The Open Grid Services Architecture - Data Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI) [13]
3

provides the first implementation for these standards. OGSA-DAI is a middleware
infrastructure for accessing and controlling data sources and sinks. Though OGSA-DAI is
widely used, its access control mechanisms are not scalable and cause substantial
overhead for resource providers in VOs because each of them has to manage a role-map
file containing authorization information for individual Grid users.

The Community Authorization Service (CAS) [14] and the Shibboleth [15] are
authorization services that have several advantages over other authorization services used
in Grids, and they both use the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [16]
standard. None of the other authorization services in Grids use a standard format to
express authorization assertions. CAS records user groups and their permissions on
resources, and it targets access control for computational and file-based storage
resources. CAS is part of the Globus Toolkit [8]. The Globus Toolkit provides a set of
basic services to establish a Grid system and it has a wide support base in the Grid
community. Shibboleth is designed to provide user attributes to requesting resources and
it targets access control for internet based resources. Shibboleth has a wide support base
in the Internet2 community. SAML is used to express authentication and authorization
assertions between different security domains.

1.3 Contribution
In this dissertation two RBAC systems for heterogeneous data resources in Data
Grids are proposed. The first system uses CAS as the main building block. This system is
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scalable in terms of the number of users and VOs; it can be quickly and easily deployed;
and it provides centralized privilege management and delegation via roles. The second
system uses Shibboleth as its main building block. This system is scalable in terms of the
number of access requests in addition to the number of users and VOs; it is robust as
there is no single point of failure; it supports the distributed management of privileges
and fine-grain attribute release policy; and it provides privacy protection for users, in
addition to dynamic delegation via roles. We also use the Core and Hierarchical RBAC
profile of the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [17] to specify
access control policies for multiple VOs. XACML is a standard of the Organization for
the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) for describing access
control policies uniformly across different security domains [18]. The Core and
Hierarchical RBAC profile of XACML defines how the ANSI core and hierarchical
RBAC standard [19] can be specified in XACML. For the distributed storage and
administration of XACML policies, we propose the use of the Object, Metadata and
Artifacts Registry (OMAR) which provides an implementation of the OASIS e-business
eXtensible Markup Language (ebXML) registry specifications. The ebXML registry
specifications are developed to achieve interoperable registries and repositories with an
interface that enables submission, query and retrieval. The main contributions of this
dissertation are outlined as follows:
•

The RBAC systems will support a wide range of security policies using roleprivileges, role hierarchies, delegations, and constraints. It is shown how the CAS
policy statements and SAML assertions can be used to support RBAC. The RBAC
profile of XACML has several drawbacks for the access control in Grids. It does not
5

address dynamic delegation of rights and dynamic user-role assignments. They are
supported in our system by using OMAR.
•

With the proposed RBAC systems resource providers will have to maintain only the
mapping information from VO roles to local roles and the local policies, thus the
administration overhead is reduced. Furthermore, the resource providers can grant or
refuse the access requests of specific users by maintaining their authorization
information separately. This enables the resource providers to have the ultimate
authority over their resources. Also, unnecessary authentication, mapping and
connections can be avoided by denying invalid requests at the VO level. The access
control systems can provide increased manageability for a large number of users and
reduce day-to-day administration tasks of the resource providers, while they maintain
the ultimate authority over their resources.

•

The integration of the systems with OGSA-DAI will bring several advantages (as
noted above) into its authorization infrastructure. Enhancements have been proposed
to the role-map files so that they can also contain mapping information from VO roles
to local database roles, and local policy. This dramatically reduces the number of
entries to be managed in the role-map files and updates to them need to be made far
less frequently. The implementation on the client side has been extended to request
and delegate policy assertions. The server-side has been extended to parse the policy
assertions to obtain the VO roles. The server also verifies the capabilities associated
with a VO role against the local policies of the resource provider and maps it to a
local database role. The performance evaluation shows that not much extra time is
required to set up the security contexts between clients and servers.
6

1.4 Outline of Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides detailed
background in terms of the major components used such as the Globus Toolkit, OGSADAI, CAS and Shibboleth. We discuss the security issues related to these components
and Data Grids in general. We explain the need for RBAC, and provide the required
concepts and foundation for our research. Chapter 3 reviews our work of the RBAC
system for Grid Databases using CAS and includes performance analysis of the system.
Chapter 4 reviews our work of the RBAC system for Grid Databases using Shibboleth
and also includes performance analysis of the system. Chapter 5 has some conclusions.

7

Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Existing Middleware for Data Grids
Distributed data resources can be diverse in their formats, schema, quality, access
mechanisms,

ownership,

access

policies,

capabilities,

and

authentication and

authorization mechanisms. To efficiently manage these, a Data Grid needs technical
solutions and standards for data discovery and access, data exploration and analysis,
resource management, and security [1, 20, 21]. The Globus Toolkit [8] provides a set of
basic services to establish a Grid system. The Open Grid Services Architecture – Data
Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI) [13] is an existing middleware implementation that
is widely used for the integration of heterogeneous data resources in Grid systems.

2.1.1 Globus Toolkit
The basic Grid middleware components provided by the Globus Toolkit are: (1)
Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI): authentication and related security services; (2)
Globus Resource Allocation Manager (GRAM): resource allocation and process
management; (3) Meta Computing Directory Service (MDS): distributed access to the
8

structure and state information of a system; (4) Globus Executable Management (GEM):
construction, caching and location of executables; (5) Global Access to Secondary
Storage (GASS): remote access to data via sequential and parallel interfaces; (6) Nexus:
unicast and multicast communication services; (7) Heart Beat Monitor (HBM):
monitoring of the health and status of system components; and (8) General Purpose
architecture for Reservation and Allocation (GARA): reservation of resources and
monitoring of reservations. In addition to these components, the Globus Toolkit
implements the Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA). OGSA integrates Grid and
Web services technologies and defines standard interfaces and behaviors for distributed
system integration and management [1]. The toolkit has recently been aligned with the
Web Services Resource Framework (WSRF) [22]. WSRF defines conventions for
managing the state in distributed systems based on Web services. For each of these
components, a C and/or Java Application Programming Interface (API) is available for
developers [23].

2.1.2 Open Grid Services Architecture – Data Access and
Integration (OGSA-DAI)
Grid integrates several communities of resource providers and resource consumers.
This integration can be technically challenging because of the need to achieve various
qualities of service when running on top of different native platforms. The Open Grid
Services Architecture (OGSA) addresses these challenges and defines uniform exposed
service semantics, the Grid Service [24]. Version 3 of the Globus Toolkit and its

9

accompanying Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) provide the first implementation of
OGSA mechanisms and cast security functions as OGSA services. This version of the
Globus Toolkit also publishes service security policies and specifies standards for
interoperability [7].

Current research in the area of Grid databases is undertaken by Project Spitfire
associated with the European Data Grid [25] and the Open Grid Services Architecture Data Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI) [13]. Project Spitfire provides access control
based on authorization tags specified within XML-based query files. These tags are
mapped by a database resource to local roles via a role-database that it maintains. A
drawback of their approach is that the role-database contains the mapping to local
database roles for all Grid users that have access to that database resource. Multiple
entries in multiple role-databases may need to be updated if new Grid users are allowed
to access multiple data resources or if the access privileges of current users change.

The Database Access and Integration Services Working Group (DAIS-WG) of the
Global Grid Forum (GGF) is currently establishing the standards for Grid interface to
data resources [12]. OGSA-DAI is a widely used middleware infrastructure, aligned with
the GGF’s OGSA vision, to facilitate uniform access to data resources using a serviceoriented architecture (SOA) [13]. OGSA-DAI provides activities to access relational,
XML databases, and indexed files, etc. It also provides data translation and third-party
delivery activities [13]. OGSA-DAI enables client applications to submit request
documents in order to perform a set of tasks on a remote data resource.
10

OGSA-DAI provides a set of core activities that implement the basic functionality needed
to interact with a data resource, and it is easy for users to add new activities that operate
within the OGSA-DAI framework [26]. OGSA-DAI users can extend OGSA-DAI web
services to expose their own data resources and to support application-specific
functionality. OGSA-DAI also provides a consistent transactional framework and
facilities to allow developers to add transactional behavior to their activities.

OGSA-DAI has over 1100 registered users and projects which require continuously
available data access and integration services [13]. OGSA-DAI is used by a number of
large projects both within the US and UK to satisfy their data access and integration
requirements. In addition to this, the OGSA-DAI project is working in close collaboration
with other major Grid middleware providers, such as Globus, IBM and the UK Open
Middleware Infrastructure Institute (OMII), to ensure that OGSA-DAI integrates
seamlessly with their products.

2.2 Issues for Access Control in Grids
The overall direction for access control architectures in Grid computing is toward
the need for leveraging IT infrastructure as it emerges. Integration with Web services and
hosting environment technologies introduces opportunities to leverage emerging security
standards and technologies such as the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
[16] and Web Services Security (WSS) [27]. Participating organizations within a Grid
often have significant investment in existing security mechanisms and infrastructure, and
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Grid services could be built on sophisticated container-based hosting environments such
as J2EE or .Net. Grid security mechanisms should interoperate with, rather than replace,
those mechanisms [6]. Most security functionality should be placed in the hosting
environments, so that application development will be simplified and security
functionality can be upgraded independently of applications [6]. The WSS specifications
address these issues. WSS is a standard mechanism for interoperability and enables the
interaction between different platforms and security models. WSS standard can be used
to transport credentials from a client to a server, such as the ones represented by SAML
attribute assertions [28]. Users need globally defined names that are recognized at all
sites they access. A user’s identity needs to be passed securely and transparently between
sites as jobs progress [29]. Users must be able to access resources dynamically without
any administrator intervention. These resources must be coordinated properly and must
interact securely with other services. Thus, resources must have global identities, and
they should be accessed without violating their local policies.

Significant challenges remain for cross-domain auditing and privacy management
[30]. An audit mechanism can be used to determine whether or not the access control
policies have been administered properly. The audit mechanism is responsible for
producing records which track security related events [31]. And, for this purpose, it is
essential to keep a log of the access requests and the enforced security policies. In
traditional systems, the audit mechanism is local to each server; however, on the Grid,
either the audit mechanism should be distributed or the audit records should be
transmitted to a location where a higher level view of the system can be constructed [32].
12

Standards are required to facilitate the audit and to reconcile different audit trails that are
distributed among different organizations. It is extremely difficult to browse the audit
logs if they are in different formats and in different administrative domains. Also, the
access control mechanism should be able to match the audit entries in different audit logs
and administrative domains.

Auditing also depends on authentication because audit records usually associate
individuals with the actions they have taken, and the identity of the user must be
determined if these entries are to be trusted [32]. The user identity can be used to identify
the user who initiated the request. The request can be logged at the resource along with
the mapping information and the subsequent actions performed. This information can be
used to find patterns that fit the profile of a system intrusion or the activities that do not
fit the profiles of legitimate users [32]. However this information could affect the privacy
of users. For example, by examining the information logged at various sites with respect
to users belonging to a particular research group, it is possible to infer their data access
patterns and thus obtain information about their work. To solve this problem, a user could
be issued a set of pseudonym identities [33] and he/she could access each site with a
different identity in the set. The information that binds the set of pseudo identities to the
user identity should be maintained securely and can be used when security violations
occur.
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2.3 Need for Role-Based Access Control for Grid Data
Resources
In Grids, both users and resources are dynamic. Furthermore, those users and
resources may belong to multiple organizations with their own diverse security policies
and mechanisms. Participating organizations may have different security models. It is
important for these models to interoperate based on different levels of trust. Trust should
be established not only among users and resources, but also among the resources
themselves so that they can be coordinated. These trust domains can span across multiple
organizations and must adapt dynamically as participants join or leave and resources are
accessed or released [6]. Resource providers must understand and support the
mechanisms and policies that are not strictly under their control.

It is desirable to group users and resources that need to be coordinated towards a
common goal into virtual organizations (VOs). The key requirement is to design access
control mechanisms for these VOs, which can interoperate with existing local security
infrastructures and allow resource providers to have the ultimate control over their
resources. A VO spanning across multiple sites can use a single security mechanism, but
usually it needs to accommodate multiple security mechanisms [29]. While
acknowledging and respecting the site autonomy, there are a number of requirements to
be met for Grid security, in order to achieve the goals of the VOs.
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Supporting role-based access control (RBAC) [9, 10] is desirable in Grids. RBAC
shows clear advantages over traditional discretionary and mandatory access control
models in such environments, because it allows a uniform representation of diverse
security policies and ensures that no security violations occur during inter-domain
accesses [5]. In RBAC, permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned
appropriate roles, thereby acquiring the roles’ permissions [11]. In a VO with a large
number of users, we could think of several groups of users, each with different levels of
access (roles). A role has certain privileges associated with it. When a VO role is mapped
to a local role, it will specify the privileges a user can have; for example, access to a
specific table of a database.

In VOs, users may be assigned specific tasks, and there may be constraints related
to the execution of those tasks. For example, a user may have access to data only during
certain days of the week, or certain tasks may be considered mutually exclusive for a
user; i.e., any two or more tasks cannot be executed at the same time. RBAC can support
a wide range of security policies using role-privileges, role hierarchies, and constraints.

The typical identity-based authorization used today is not scalable because
authorization information should be maintained for each user. In RBAC, authorization
information is associated with roles, not with individual users. It has been shown that the
cost of administering RBAC is proportional to U+P per role, while the cost of associating
users directly with permissions is proportional to U×P, where U is the number of
individuals in a role and P is the number of permissions required by the role [34, 35].
15

In certain instances, a user may wish to delegate only a subset of its rights to an
application to act on its behalf. This requirement can usually arise in systems where a
limited trust relationship is established between entities. For example, a user may contact
a data mining service to mine certain data sets that the user has access to. If the trust
between the user and the service is limited, then the user may want to delegate only a
specific subset of its rights to the service, thus enabling it to complete only the required
task and nothing more. With RBAC, such delegation could be done easily. For example,
a user in a special role can delegate privileges to other roles.

RBAC is distinguished by its inherent support for the Principle of Least Privilege
[30], which requires that a user be given no more privileges than necessary to perform a
job [9]. It can be easily enforced by first identifying the roles in an organization correctly
and then assigning only those privileges to each role that allow the role members to
perform their tasks. Users can request a particular role among those they are entitled to
and, hence, gain the specific permissions tied with that role. Furthermore, current RBAC
models are modular and can thus incorporate sophisticated functionality such as RBAC
policy administration. Also, more complex forms of access control, such as task-based
access control (TBAC), can be layered on RBAC [10].
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2.4 Drawbacks of the Access Control Mechanisms in
OGSA-DAI
To date, most work on data storage, access and transfer on the Grid has focused on
files [36], but the Grid can also be used to integrate various distributed heterogeneous
databases and supports query/transaction processing on them through a uniform interface
[36, 37]. The use of databases in Data Grids presents different security needs and access
policies compared with the use of computational resources. For example, certain
applications may be authorized to access only certain parts of the information in a
database during a specific time interval. OGSA-DAI uses Access Control Lists (ACLs)
for user authorization.

OGSA-DAI supports access control via an ACL held in a role-map file that maps
individual Grid users to local database usernames and passwords. In this case, each
resource provider has to maintain a role-map file to authorize access to its resources. This
access control method is not suitable for VOs, especially in terms of scalability, because
both users and resources are dynamic in VOs. Multiple entries in multiple role-map files
may need to be updated if new users are allowed to access multiple data resources or if
the access privileges of current users change, which is not unusual in Data Grids. This
puts an unnecessary burden on the resource providers in managing the role-map files,
especially when both the users and resource providers belong to multiple VOs.
Furthermore, there are unnecessary overheads on the server side whenever users make
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invalid requests. This is because users are authenticated, mapped and connected without
first verifying their requests against their access privileges.

2.5 Incorporation of Existing Authorization Services in
Data Grids
None of the current access control systems in Grids provide comprehensive support
for RBAC. We will use the Community Authorization Service (CAS) and Shibboleth
(along with the GridShib interface) to support RBAC in OGSA-DAI, as described later in
Chapters 3 and 4. CAS and Shibboleth services have certain advantages over other
authorization services for Grids, such as the Virtual Organization Management Service
(VOMS) [38] and Akenti [39]. VOMS authorization assertions do not provide rights
directly, and they need to be interpreted by the resource. As far as Akenti is concerned, it
is targeted on authorizing accesses to web resources and particularly websites, so it is not
adequate for VOs [38]. Akenti does not provide support for dynamic delegation [40].
Delegation is a key issue in a VO, wherein a set of rights can be delegated to a program
for it to act on behalf of a user. A program should also be able to delegate some of its
rights to other programs [3].

PERMIS [40] is an attribute-based authorization service, and so is VOMS. They
use assertions that bind the attributes to users for authorization, as opposed to the typical
identity-based authorization used today [28]. However, currently they do not support any

18

standard for how attributes are transferred from the attribute authority to the Grid services
and no standard is used for expressing the policy regarding those attributes [28].

SAML can be used to express authorization queries, and Extensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML) [18] can be used to express authorization policy statements.
Except CAS and Shibboleth, which use the SAML standard, none of the other
authorization services use a standard format to express authorization assertions. SAML is
used to uniformly express the authentication and authorization assertions between
different security domains. These assertions could contain the following three types of
statements: (1) Authentication statements which assert that the user has been
authenticated by the authorization service; (2) Attribute statements which can express the
attributes of the user such as institutional affiliation, group membership, and so on; (3)
Authorization decision statements which can assert how a user is allowed to access a
resource.

2.5.1 Community Authorization Service (CAS)
The Community Authorization service (CAS) provides a scalable mechanism for
specifying and enforcing complex and dynamic policies that govern resource usage
within Grids. It allows resource providers to delegate some of the authority for
maintaining fine-grain access control policies to communities, while still maintaining the
ultimate authority over their resources [14].
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A community runs a CAS server to keep track of its membership and fine-grain
access control policies. A user accessing community resources contacts the CAS server,
which delegates rights to the user based on the request and the user's responsibilities
within the community. These rights are in the form of capabilities, which users can
present at a resource to gain access on behalf of the community. The user effectively
obtains the intersection of the set of rights granted to the community by the resource
provider and the set of rights defined by the capabilities granted to the user by the
community. The CAS server uses a backend database to store the capabilities of the
users. The CAS architecture builds on the public key authentication and delegation
mechanisms provided by the Globus Toolkit’s Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [14].

If a user of a community needs to gain access to a resource, the user generates a
proxy credential which is signed by his/her own user credential. The proxy credential is
presented to the CAS server, which returns a new credential, known as CAS proxy
credential. This credential contains the CAS policy assertions to represent the user’s
capabilities and restrictions as an extension. SAML authorization decision statements are
used to express the CAS policy assertions. The CAS proxy credential is presented to the
resource provider. The resource provider verifies the validity of the proxy credential and
then parses the CAS policy assertions to obtain the restrictions imposed by the CAS
server. Thus, the CAS credential facilitates the mapping of the user to a local account,
and the restrictions determine the operations the user is allowed to perform.
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CAS provides scalability in terms of the number of users and VOs. The CAS
structure reduces the number of necessary trust relationships from C×P to C+P, when
there are C consumers and P providers. Each consumer needs to be known and trusted by
the CAS server, but not by each provider. Similarly, each provider needs to be known and
trusted by the CAS server, but not by each consumer [14]. However, in terms of the
actual number of access requests on resources, using a single CAS server may not be
quite scalable. A single CAS server can be a bottleneck if a large number of users attempt
to access it at the same time, and it can be a single point of failure. A possible solution for
these problems depends on how frequently the community policies change. If the
community policies do not change frequently, a single master server can be maintained to
accept the changes and then routinely replicate the policies to one or more read-only
slave servers. If the community policies change frequently, multiple peer servers can be
used. All the servers update the policies, so that the failure of any one server will not lead
to a loss of functionality [14].

However, when policies are changing dynamically, it is believed that complete
centralization of policies (which can be realized by using CAS) can achieve better
consistency. Also, in the case that a user credential is compromised, revocation is easier
when a single CAS server is used because the user needs to be removed only from that
server [14]. Even though CAS was designed primarily for fine-grain policies, it has been
also shown to be capable of asserting coarse-grain group memberships [41, 42]. CAS
comes packaged within the Globus Toolkit and is easily deployable.
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2.5.2 Shibboleth and GridShib
In the GridShib project [33], they leverage the local security infrastructures of
different organizations so that users can be authenticated to Grid resources by using the
methods already supported at their home organizations. The goal of GridShib is to create
a distributed authorization framework that supports anonymous interactions between
users and, hence, protects their privacy. The rights of the users can be expressed using
attributes such as institutional affiliation, group membership, or their role in collaboration
[33]. Resource providers can make informed authorization decisions using these
attributes unlike in identity-based authorization. For example, only graduate students
studying computer science in a particular university and enrolled in a particular course
can gain access to certain database records.

GridShib incorporates the Shibboleth [15], which is an Attribute Authority service,
developed by the Internet2 community for cross-organization identity federation [33].
Shibboleth creates a distributed authorization infrastructure for web resources, and
simplifies access control policies and makes them more scalable [43]. It enables
anonymous interaction between users, thus protecting individual privacy while still
providing basic security for resource providers [33]. The Shibboleth service maps a user
name and attributes onto a unique identifying handle. To protect the user’s privacy, the
service can restrict the information about the holder of the handle depending on who is
asking for the information. For example, it does not release the user’s name except to
those requestors who have been authorized [29].
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A target Grid service authenticates a user by using GSI, determines the address of
the appropriate Shibboleth attribute service in the process, and then obtains the selected
user attributes, that the Grid Service is authorized to see, from the Shibboleth service.
These attributes are presented using SAML attribute statements. To determine the address
of the Shibboleth attribute service, the Grid service obtains a pointer that will be placed in
the user’s proxy certificate [33]. The attributes obtained will then be used by the Grid
service in making authorization decisions. These attributes will be passed securely
through a trust relationship to the Grid service. To provide anonymity in the Grid context,
users are issued a set of credentials with pseudonym identifiers, and they will have the
option of releasing only a subset of their attributes to particular resources. For example,
identifying information about the user doesn’t need to be released.

2.6 Concepts and Foundation for our Research Topics
In order to provide scalable and fine-grain access control in Data Grids, we will
enhance the access control mechanisms in OGSA-DAI to allow users to be assigned
memberships on VO roles and to support role hierarchies and constraints. We will show
that the SAML assertions of CAS and Shibboleth can provide the user’s privileges
directly in addition to the VO roles. These assertions could be obtained by the resource
using either a push model or a pull model. In the push model, the user can directly obtain
the permissions from the authorization server and pass them to the target resources at the
time of making a request. The resource will verify the authenticity of the user and then
authorize the user based on the permissions obtained, provided the authority that issued
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them is trustworthy. The advantage of the push model is that the user can explicitly select
a role. Also, in the case that the user and the authorization service belong to the same
organization and are protected by a firewall, the push model should be deployed because
the resources may not be able to contact the authorization service directly. Some
authorization services, like Akenti, support the pull model, where the user is
authenticated by a target resource. The target resource contacts the authorization server to
obtain the user’s permissions. An advantage of the pull model is that it can be deployed
easily because users do not need to interact with the authorization service [33].

Specification of VO policies by CAS and Shibboleth will allow for authorization
decisions to be made easily based on the user’s request and VO policies. In case the user
does not possess the required privileges, the access can be denied by CAS and Shibboleth
without involving the resource providers. For OGSA-DAI, this eliminates authentication,
mapping and connection overheads on the resource providers in case the user’s request is
not valid. The resource providers then need to maintain only the mapping information
from the VO roles to local database roles and the local policies, thus the number of
entries to be managed in the role-map files will be reduced dramatically. When users
join/leave collaborations, the resource providers do not have to bother about updating
their information in the role-map files, because the authorization service can just
grant/revoke their memberships on the VO roles. Different VOs may have different role
structures. Furthermore, the resource providers can grant or refuse the access requests of
specific users by maintaining their authorization information separately in the role-map
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files. This will enable the resource providers to maintain ultimate authority over their
resources.

2.6.1 Enforcement of VO Policies
user1

user2

userGroup1
SELECT, UPDATE

membership

GMT#10.01.2005-07.30.2006#MON-FRI#19:00-5:00

VO Role

ER,RN=Physician

Local Role

Local
Physician

SELECT, UPDATE
Trigger for enforcing timing constraint

Figure 2.1: Mapping VO Roles to Local Roles

In our systems, the decision to map a VO role to a local role lies in the hands of the
resource provider. The assignment of privileges to the local role and specifying
constraints on it will also be the responsibility of the resource provider. For example, as
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shown

in

Figure

2.1,

a

resource

provider

could

decide

to

map

the

ER,RoleName=Physician role, where ER could be an Emergency Team that forms a VO
across several hospitals, to a local role that allows the SELECT and UPDATE operations
to be performed between 19:00 and 5:00 GMT, Monday through Friday during
10.01.2006–07.30.2006 (say, only for those patients affected by a natural disaster). This
timing constraint could be enforced by a database trigger, which executes an action
automatically on the occurrence of a predefined event. The privileges and constraints
associated with the local role can be negotiated between the VO and the resource
provider. Alternatively, if local privileges and constraints have been fixed already, they
can be made known to the VO.

The VO can restrict the policies further by specifying a subset of the privileges
associated with the local role and/or specifying tighter constraints. For example,
applications invoked by users in a Junior Physician VO role may be allowed to perform
SELECT and UPDATE operations only between 21:00 and 5:00 GMT, instead of
between 19:00 and 5:00 GMT. This scheme allows the VO to change privileges and
constraints without involving the resource provider. However, these changes have to be
enforced at the VO level. For example, the user’s query and the current time can be
examined in order to check the conformance with those changes. In this way, the resource
provider does not have to create new local roles in addition to existing ones because both
the original and restricted VO roles can be mapped to the same local role. Furthermore,
the resource provider can enforce more restrictions in addition to those imposed by the
VO policy; for example, restricting the access privilege of particular users based on their
26

institutional affiliation. For this purpose, the resource provider can maintain a separate
list of users and deny their access by checking the Grid identity in the SAML assertion.
This enables the resource provider to have the ultimate authority over its resources.

2.6.2 Distributing VO Policies among Resource Providers
If roles and privileges do not change often and VOs have a long lifespan, then it is
feasible to distribute the VO policies among the various resource providers. The finegrain privileges and constraints associated with the local role can be negotiated between
the VO and the resource provider. But, the resource provider will have control over the
actual assignment of fine-grain privileges to the local role and the specification of
constraints on it. For example, a resource provider could grant permission to perform
basic database operations (e.g., SELECT) on a particular database table. The resource
provider could also grant permissions for more complex operations such as executing
stored database procedures.

With our systems, a user can delegate a subset of his/her authorized VO roles to
certain applications and services. In this case, the privileges associated with the delegated
VO roles are the privileges associated with the corresponding local roles. As shown in
Figure 2.2, after a negotiation with a VO, a resource provider could decide to map the
Alpha,RN=Supervisor role (where Alpha is the name of the VO) to a local Supervisor
role that allows the function updateInventory( ) to be performed between 9:00 and 5:00
GMT from Monday to Friday during 01.20.2006–07.30.2006. Another resource provider
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could decide to map the same VO role to a local Employee role that allows the function
viewInventory() to be performed between 19:00 and 5:00 GMT from Monday to Friday
during 05.20.2006–07.30.2006.
user2

user1

DB1

updateInventory( )

userGroup1
membership

GMT#01.20.2006-07.30.2006#MON-FRI#9:00-5:00

Supervisor

Local Roles

Alpha,RN=Supervisor
Employee

VO Role

GMT#05.20.2006-07.30.2006#MON-FRI#19:00-5:00
viewInventory( )
DB2

Figure 2.2: Distributing VO Policy among the Resource Providers
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Chapter 3
RBAC with CAS in the OGSA-DAI
System
The goal of this research topic was to design and implement a Role-based Access
Control (RBAC) system with CAS, which can be quickly and easily deployed at various
sites using the Open Grid Services Architecture – Data Access and Integration (OGSADAI). We demonstrate that our system can support RBAC for multiple virtual
organizations (VOs) to access Grid databases within the OGSA-DAI framework. Our
system extends the access control mechanism supported by OGSA-DAI to allow users to
be assigned memberships on VO roles, to assign privileges and specify constraints on
those roles, and to allow role hierarchies.

In our system, CAS maintains the security policies of VOs, grants users’
memberships on VO roles, and then authorizes them in those roles. The resource
providers need to maintain only the mapping information from VO roles to local database
roles and the local policies, thus the number of entries in the role-map file is reduced
dramatically. Our system also allows the specification of policies at the VO level, thus if
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the users do not possess the required privileges, their access can be denied at the VO level
itself. This eliminates unnecessary authentication, mapping and connection overheads on
the resource providers. When users join/leave a VO, the resource providers do not have to
bother about individually adding/removing their information in the role-map files because
the CAS server can just grant/revoke their memberships on the VO roles. Furthermore,
the resource providers can grant or refuse the access requests of specific users by
maintaining their authorization information separately in the role-map files. This enables
the resource providers to have the ultimate authority over their resources.

We have implemented the proposed system and analyzed its performance. In our
implementation, users obtain CAS credentials based on user credentials. The user
credential is formed by an X.509 certificate and the associated public/private keys and is
issued by a Certificate Authority (CA) trusted by all entities in a Grid [44]. The CAS
credentials contain the authorization information for the user in terms of his/her VO roles.
We have extended the client-side implementation of OGSA-DAI to pass the CAS
credential. The server-side has been extended to parse the CAS credential to obtain the
VO roles. The server also verifies the capabilities associated with that VO role against the
local policies of the resource provider and maps it to a local database role. We have
evaluated our solution in terms of the overheads incurred when security contexts are set
up between a client and a server. This has been done with respect to the original security
mechanism in OGSA-DAI.
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The organization of the chapter is as follows: Section 3.1 describes how users can
access a data resource using OGSA-DAI Services. In Section 3.2, we describe the
drawbacks for the existing approach for RBAC with CAS. In Section 3.3, we present our
RBAC system using CAS in OGSA-DAI. Section 3.4 describes the implementation
details, and Section 3.5 describes the results of performance analysis.

3.1 OGSA-DAI Services
In order to expose physical data resources to the Grid, by extending the interfaces
defined by Open Grid Services Infrastructure (OGSI) [45], OGSA-DAI introduced the
following services [46]: (1) Grid Data Service Factory (GDSF): Represents a data
resource, and exposes its capabilities and metadata. (2) Grid Data Service (GDS): Created
by a GDSF and holds the client session with the data resource. (3) DAI Service Group
Registry (DAISGR): Clients can discover service/data by locating GDSFs registered with
a DAISGR.

Figure 3.1 shows how clients can access data resources using OGSA-DAI. The
client first contacts the DAISGR and gets information about the registered GDSFs. The
client then contacts the desired GDSF and makes a request for the creation of a GDS.
Once the GDS is created, it authorizes the client and establishes a JDBC connection to
the underlying database. The client can then submit queries on the database and retrieve
results. The client authorization process is discussed in detail in Section 2.1.
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Figure 3.1: Accessing a Data Resource through OGSA-DAI

CAS was initially designed to record user groups and their permissions, but in our
system, CAS has been incorporated to support RBAC within the OGSA-DAI framework.
With our system, the resource providers can delegate the fine-grain authorization to CAS
which will grant users’ memberships on VO roles and then authorize them in those roles.

3.2 Drawbacks of the Existing Approach for RBAC
with CAS
A proposed approach for supporting RBAC with CAS is the use of rights
associated with a role to access role-specific resources [41]. The role of a user is
presented in a hierarchical form. For example, Alpha/admin indicates the administrator
role of a virtual organization Alpha. Alpha could be the name of a project undertaken by
collaborating organizations. In VOs, users may be assigned specific tasks, and there may
be constraints related to the execution of those tasks. For example, a user may have
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access to data only during certain days of the week. One of the key aspects of RBAC is
that it allows the specification of constraints on roles [10]. However, the approach
proposed in [41] does not address this aspect of RBAC. Another drawback is that for a
user to act in multiple roles, multiple CAS proxy certificates have to be created.

Most systems do not enforce the Principle of Least Privilege [47]. An application
must be delegated only those privileges required for completing a certain set of tasks,
otherwise the application should be totally trusted to do no more than required. In Grids,
this is even more critical since software can be regularly downloaded from remote sites.
In addition to the possibility of downloading malicious software such as Viruses, Trojans,
Worms, and so on, we cannot expect software to work exactly as specified because of
bugs or malicious intent. Any software with certain extra privileges has the potential to
cause severe damage to computer systems and data. When the method proposed in [41] is
used in CAS, the Principle of Least Privilege is not always enforced. Users authorized to
act in a role may be granted some privileges in addition to those assigned to that role.
This is because both roles and privileges are set up in the same way. In particular, a role
is considered as a resource, and a user group is given the “member” right on a role, in the
same way that a user group is given the “read” right on a resource such as a file. With the
current implementation of CAS, a user belonging to multiple groups can request and be
authorized any combination of roles and privileges from one or more of those groups at
the same time.
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The following example illustrates this problem. The VO Alpha may have a policy
in which programmers are allowed only read access to a particular file while supervisors
are allowed read/write access. To implement this policy based on the method proposed in
[41], two roles, “Alpha/programmer” and “Alpha/supervisor”, can be created as shown in
Figures 3.2 and 3.3. The “Alpha/programmer” role can be assigned the “read” right on
“ftp://localhost/tmp/fileA.txt”, and the “Alpha/supervisor” role can be assigned the “read”
and “write” rights on “ftp://localhost/tmp/fileA.txt”. As users of userGroup1 are given the
“member” right on the role “Alpha/programmer”, they can acquire the “read” right on
“ftp://localhost/tmp/fileA.txt.” Similarly, as users of userGroup2 are given the “member”
right on the role “Alpha/supervisor”, they can acquire the “read” and “write” rights on
“ftp://localhost/tmp/fileA.txt”. If a user “user1” is in both userGroup1 and userGroup2,
and makes a request to act in the “Alpha/programmer” role with the “read” and “write”
rights on “ftp://localhost/tmp/fileA.txt”, CAS will authorize the request because “user1”
is a member of both user groups. This authorization decision clearly violates the VO
policy in terms of the Principle of Least Privilege, since a programmer is granted write
access to a file while he/she is allowed only read access to it. If there is an application
that analyzes data for programmers, it must be delegated only the read access to the file.
Delegating the write access to the application can potentially result in an alteration of the
file.

A possible refinement to this method is distributing the VO policies to the resource
providers while keeping only the assignment of users to the VO roles within CAS. This
method is applicable if roles and privileges do not change often and VOs have a long
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lifespan. CAS is not used to associate the privileges with roles to access role-specific
resources. Instead, the VO role is mapped to a local role, and the assignment of fine-grain
privileges to the local role is the responsibility of the resource provider. The fine-grain
privileges associated with the local role can be negotiated between the VO and the
resource provider.
user1

user2

userGroup1
read

member

ftp://localhost/tmp
/fileA.txt

Alpha/
programmer

Figure 3.2: userGroup1 with a Role Alpha/programmer and Read
Access to ftp://local host/tmp/fileA.txt

user1

read
write

user3

userGroup2

ftp://localhost/tmp
/fileA.txt

member
Alpha/
supervisor

Figure 3.3: userGroup2 with a Role Alpha/supervisor and Read/Write
Access to ftp://local host/tmp/fileA.txt
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A user can delegate a subset of his/her authorized VO roles to certain applications
and services. In this case, the privileges associated with the delegated VO roles are the
privileges associated with the corresponding local roles. As shown in Figure 3.4, after a
negotiation with a VO, a resource provider could decide to map the “Alpha/supervisor”
role to a local “Supervisor” role that allows the function updateInventory( ) to be
performed on a database (DB1). Another resource provider could decide to map the same
VO role to a local “Employee” role that allows the function viewInventory( ) to be
performed on another database (DB2). This method enforces the Principle of Least
Privilege since a user can receive no more privileges for a VO role other than those tied
with the corresponding local roles. However, a VO does not have the flexibility to update
VO policy without contacting the resource providers because they control the assignment
of privileges to the local roles.

user2

user1

DB1
userGroup1

updateInventory( )
Supervisor

member

Local Roles

Alpha/supervisor
Employee

VO Role

viewInventory( )
DB2

Figure 3.4: Distributing VO Policies to the Resource Providers
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3.3 Our Proposed System for RBAC Using CAS
Specification of policies at the VO level allows authorization decisions to be made
based on the user’s request and VO policies. In case the user does not possess the
required privileges, the access can be denied at the VO level itself without involving the
resource providers. This eliminates authentication, mapping and connection overheads on
the resource providers in case the request is not valid. Our proposed system is
implemented using a newer version of CAS which supports SAML. Participating
organizations within VOs may have different security models. So, it is important for these
models to interoperate at different levels of trust, and SAML can be used to uniformly
express the authorization assertions between different security domains.

The CAS server contains policy statements that specify who (which user or group)
has the permission, which resource or resource group the permission is granted on, and
what permission is granted [14]. The permission is denoted by a service type and an
action. The action describes the operation (e.g., read, write or execute program), and the
service type defines the namespace in which the action is defined (e.g., file). Different
resource providers may recognize different service types, but all resource providers that
recognize the same service type should have the same interpretation of that service type's
actions [14].
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To support RBAC using CAS, we define the role as a new service type, and each
role name in the form of “[VOName{,SubgroupName}][,RN=rolename]”1 as an action.
Roles

can

be

specified

for

any

subgroup

within

a

VO.

For

example,

“Alpha,RN=Manager” indicates the Manager role for the Alpha VO, whereas
“Alpha,Data,RN=Manager” indicates the Manager role for the Data subgroup of the
Alpha VO.
For each role name, we can specify the actions (privileges and constraints) and some
junior roles. Resources represented in the form, “URI{.Subcomponent}” are associated
with usergroups in the CAS database. Thus, fine-grain authorization for resources can be
allowed, where access control can be specified not only for the entire resource (e.g.
database) but also for the subcomponents of a resource (e.g. table). For example,
“http://130.108.17.176:8080/ogsa/services/ogsadai/SecureGridDataServiceFactory.Emplo
yee” indicates the Employee table in the database represented by the specified URI. This
permits the members of a usergroup to access a resource in a specific role. We propose
new service types and actions to assign privileges on roles, and to specify timing
constraints as described in the following subsections. With these proposed ideas,
privileges can be specified at fine-grain levels.

1

The curly brackets {} indicate zero or more occurrences of their content and the square brackets []
indicate only one occurrence of their content.
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3.3.1 Specifying Privileges and Timing Constraints on VO
Roles
To assign privileges on a role, we define the role name as a service type and each
privilege in the form of “privilege:operation” as an action. This allows the specification
of a privilege in terms of the operation permitted for a specific role. For example, the role
name “Alpha,RN=Manager” could have “privilege:select” as a privilege to execute the
SELECT operation. Obviously, not only the basic database operations, but also complex
operations, such as transactions and stored procedures, can be assigned as privileges.

To specify a timing constraint on a role, we define the role name as a service type
and the timing constraint in the following form as an action:
“timing_constraint:[local/GMT] [Date#Day#Time]{;Date#Day#Time}” where
• Date can be “[FromDate-ToDate]{,FromDate-ToDate}”
• Day can be “[FromDay-ToDay]{,FromDay-ToDay}” or “[Day]{,Day}”
• Time can be “[FromTime-ToTime]{,FromTime-ToTime}”
For

example,

the

role

name

“Alpha,RN=Manager”

could

have

“timing_constraint:GMT#10.01.2005-07.30.2006#Mon-Fri#1:00-5:00,17:00-21:00”,
indicating that the user can act in that role only within the time intervals 1:00–5:00 and
17:00–21:00 GMT from Monday to Friday during 10.01.2005–07.30.2006.
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3.3.2 Specifying Role Hierarchies
A role hierarchy defines a seniority relation between roles, whereby senior roles
automatically acquire the permissions of the junior roles. In the role hierarchy diagrams
[48], senior roles are placed at the top of the junior roles. According to the NIST standard
for RBAC [48], there are two types of role hierarchies: limited hierarchy and general
hierarchy. In the limited hierarchy, each senior role cannot have more than one junior
role. On the other hand, in the general hierarchy, each senior role can have multiple
junior roles. However, in both types, a junior role can have multiple senior roles.
Examples of a limited hierarchy and a general hierarchy are illustrated in Figures 3.5 and
3.6, respectively.
Supervisor

Programmer

Employee

Figure 3.5: An Example of Limited Role Hierarchy.

The selection of the type of role hierarchy is made by the VO. To specify a role
hierarchy, we define each senior role name as a service type and each junior role name in
the form of “junior_role:[VOName{,SubgroupName}][,RN=rolename]” as an action. For
example,

in

Figure

3.6,

the

senior

role

name

“Alpha,RN=Manager”

has

“junior_role:Alpha,RN=Supervisor” and “junior_role:Alpha,RN=Programmer” as junior
role names, and thereby inherits their privileges.
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Manager

Supervisor

Programmer

Secretary

Employee

Figure 3.6: An Example of General Role Hierarchy.

The constraints on a junior role are also inherited by a senior role [28]. In our
method, the timing constraint specified on a senior role would override those on the
junior roles. If a timing constraint is not specified on a senior role, then it inherits the
timing constraints of its junior roles. However, there should be no conflicts between the
timing constraints on the junior roles. If such conflicts exist, then the concept of limited
inheritance [10] can be used. With limited inheritance, a senior role can inherit only a
subset of privileges of a junior role. The following example illustrates the concept of
limited inheritance. As shown in the hierarchy of Figure 3.6, the Manager role is senior to
both the Supervisor and Programmer roles. Managers can be prevented from inheriting
specific privileges of the Supervisor role by defining a new role Supervisor′ as shown in
Figure 3.7. Only those specific privileges not to be inherited by the Manager role can be
assigned to the Supervisor′ role and the rest of the original set of privileges can be
retained by the Supervisor role. The Supervisor′ role can inherit the privileges from the
Supervisor role, thus acquires the entire set of privileges originally held by the Supervisor
role. The Manager role can then inherit the privileges of the Supervisor role but not the
privileges of the Supervisor′ role. Similarly, by creating the Programmer′ role, the
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Manager role can be prevented from inheriting specific privileges originally held by the
Programmer role.
Supervisor′

Supervisor

Manager

Programmer

Programmer′

Secretary

Employee

Figure 3.7: Limited Inheritance

To deal with conflicting constraints on junior roles, some modifications to the
approach illustrated above are required. If conflicting timing constraints exist on the
Supervisor and Programmer roles shown in Figure 3.6, then new timing constraints with
no conflicts can be specified on those roles while each retains the entire set of its
privileges. The Manager role can then inherit the privileges and new constraints on the
Supervisor and Programmer roles. The original timing constraints of the Supervisor and
Programmer roles can be specified on the Supervisor′ and Programmer′ roles,
respectively. These timing constraints will then override the new constraints specified on
the Supervisor and Programmer roles. The Supervisor′ and Programmer′ roles are not
assigned any privileges and can inherit all the privileges from the Supervisor and
Programmer roles, respectively. Thus the Supervisor′ and Programmer′ roles possess the
set of timing constraints and privileges originally associated with the Supervisor and
Programmer roles, respectively. While the original information of the Supervisor and
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Programmer roles is retained, the Manager role can still inherit their privileges without
any conflicts due to the newly specified timing constraints.

3.3.3 Authorization Decision Statement in the CAS credential
Once the roles and their privileges and constraints are specified in the CAS
database as described above, a SAML authorization decision statement is included in the
CAS credential. An example of the SAML authorization decision statement is shown in
Figure 3.8, and its components, denoted by (1), (2), (3) and (4), are explained as follows:
(1) specifies the time period during which the authorization decision is valid.
(2) specifies the URI of the resource on which the permissions are granted.
(3) specifies the identity of the user to whom the permissions are granted.
(4) specifies what permissions are granted.

The user identified by the Subject in (3) is authorized in the role
“Alpha,RN=Manager” with the privilege to execute the UPDATE operation on the
resource specified in (2). Also, “Alpha,RN=Manager” inherits, from its junior role
“Alpha,RN=Supervisor”, the privilege to execute the SELECT operation on the same
resource with the specified timing constraint “gmt#10.01.2005-07.30.2006#MONFRI#19:00-5:00”. The timing constraint specifies the duration for which the user can
access the resource in the authorized role. This authorization decision is valid for the time
period specified in (1).
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<Assertion xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"
AssertionID="8b53a37e-3116-44e2-a499-67e2d0fe49f1"
IssueInstant="2005-12-02T19:58:23Z"
Issuer="O=Grid,OU=GlobusTest,OU=simpleCAmotive.cs.wright.edu,CN=Globus Simple CA" MajorVersion="1"
MinorVersion="0">
<Conditions NotBefore="2005-12-02T19:58:23Z" NotOnOrAfter=
"2005-12-02T21:20:53Z"></Conditions>

(1)

<AuthorizationDecisionStatement Decision="permit"
Resource="http://130.108.17.176:8080/ogsa/services/ogsadai/SecureGrid
DataServiceFactory.Employee">
<Subject> /O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest/OU=simpleCAmotive.cs.wright.edu/OU=cs.wright.edu/CN=John Doe
</Subject>
……..
<Action Namespace="role">Alpha,RN=Manager</Action>
<Action Namespace="Alpha,RN=Manager">privilege:
update</Action>
<Action Namespace ="Alpha,RN=Manager">junior_role:
Alpha,RN=Supervisor</Action>

(2)
(3)

(4)

<Action Namespace="Alpha,RN=Supervisor">privilege:
select</Action>
<Action Namespace="Alpha,RN=Supervisor">timing_constraint:
gmt#10.01.2005-07.30.2006#MON-FRI#19:00-5:00</Action>
</AuthorizationDecisionStatement>
……..

Figure 3.8: SAML Authorization Decision Statement Issued by CAS

3.4 Implementation Details
CAS has a backend database for storing information about users, resources and
associated privileges. The VO members are granted user credentials signed by a
Certificate Authority (CA). CAS issues a certificate to authorize users based on their
requested role, their user credentials and the role membership information in the CAS
database. The CAS database administrator can delegate the right to grant/revoke
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memberships on roles to other users, and those users can exercise that right only within
the user groups to which they belong.

CAS provides a set of APIs for managing fine-grain access policies for resources in
a VO [17]. The Service API of CAS provides an administrative interface for managing
the user groups and associated privileges. This API supports the user’s role assignments
in our method. CAS also provides a Client API through which users can obtain a signed
SAML assertion and present it to the resource provider for authorization. The OGSADAI client program uses the Java Generic Security Services API (GSSAPI) to delegate
the CAS credential to a Grid Data Service (GDS).
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<!-- (c) International Business Machines Corporation, 2002 - 2004. -->
<!-- (c) University of Edinburgh, 2002 - 2004. -->
<!-- See OGSA-DAI-Licence.txt for licencing information. -->
<DatabaseRoles>
<Database name="jdbc:mysql://130.108.17.176/ogsadai">
<User dn="No Certificate Provided" userid="ogsadai" password="ogsadai" />
<User dn="/O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest/OU=simpleCAmotive.cs.wright.edu/OU=cs.wright.edu/CN=John Doe"
userid="ogsadai" password="ogsadai" />
<User dn="ER,RN=Physician" userid="username" password="password"/>
<Role Name="ER,RN=Physician">
<Action Namespace="role">privilege:select</Action>
<Action Namespace="role">privilege:update</Action>
<Action Namespace="role">timing_constraint:GMT#10.01.200507.30.2006#MON-FRI#19:00-5:00</Action>
</Role>
</Database>
</DatabaseRoles>

Figure 3.9: Modified Role-map File

We configured CAS to incorporate the proposed RBAC method as described before
and modified the OGSA-DAI implementation to make use of the CAS credentials. The
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modifications are made at both client-side and server-side. The client is modified to
delegate the CAS credential instead of the user proxy credential. The server is modified
to recognize the CAS credential delegated by the client and to obtain the VO role from it
using the GSSAPI libraries. The modified server also verifies the privileges and
constraints associated with the VO role against the local policy, and performs the
mapping based on that role via the role-map file. The role-map file has been extended to
include the mapping from a VO role to a database username and a password. Also
included in it are the local policy details as shown in Figure 3.9. The role-map file can
also include a list of users for whom access would be denied based on their Grid identity.
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Figure 3.10: User’s Normal Proxy Credential and CAS Proxy Credential Creation
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The following is the sequential process of a Grid user obtaining a CAS credential
for accessing a resource. As shown in Figure 3.10, a user generates a certificate (Cu) by
making a request to a Certificate Authority (CA) which is trusted by all the entities within
the Grid, i.e., all users and resources. If a user needs to gain access to a resource, the user
generates a proxy credential (Cup) which is signed by his/her user certificate (Cu). This
generated proxy credential's lifetime will be less than the lifetime of the user certificate.
The lifetime of a proxy credential generated using the Globus Toolkit is 12 hours. In
order to use a CAS credential, the user makes a request to the CAS server to initiate a
CAS proxy based on the user’s proxy credential. The CAS server authenticates the user
and obtains the user’s capability details present in the CAS database. The CAS server
then creates a CAS proxy credential (Cucasp) which contains the CAS policy assertions
to represent the user’s capabilities and restrictions as an extension to the existing user
proxy credential (Cup).
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Figure 3.11: Accessing a Data Resource through OGSADAI Using a CAS Credential
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As shown in Figure 3.11, once the user has obtained the CAS credential with the
requested assertions, the user can contact the desired GDSF to create a GDS. The GDS
gets the CAS credential delegated by the user, and verifies the capabilities against its
local policy present in the role-map file. The GDS also checks if any specified timing
constraint is violated.
#Initiate a User Proxy
% grid-proxy-init
Your identity: /O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest/OU=simpleCAmotive.cs.wright.edu/OU=cs.wright.edu/CN=John Doe
Enter GRID pass phrase for this identity:
Creating proxy... Done
Your proxy is valid until: Fri Dec 2 21:20:53 2005
#Initiate a CAS Proxy
%cas-proxy-init -c
http://localhost:8080/ogsa/services/base/cas/CASService -t tag
#Contacting a specific GDSF using CAS capabilities
%java uk.org.ogsadai.client.Client -mls -role ER,RN=Physician -t tag -factory
http://130.108.17.176:8080/ogsa/services/ogsadai/SecureGridDataService
Factory examples/GDSPerform/JDBC/query/select1Row.xml

Figure 3.12: User Session Accessing a GDS Using CAS

Figure 3.12 depicts a typical user session using the command-line tools provided by
the Globus Toolkit, CAS and OGSA-DAI, which shows the initiations of the user proxy
and the CAS proxy. We have modified the OGSA-DAI client to accept the CAS
credential and the desired VO role specified as shown in Figure 3.12. Based on the VO
role of the user, a JDBC connection is established between the GDS and the database
exposed by the GDSF. If no role is provided in the CAS credential, then the user’s
identity is used for mapping. The client can submit queries to the GDS and obtain the
results in XML documents.

48

In our implementation, the GDS checks the local policy in the role-map file against
the policy assertion in the CAS credential only before connecting the client to the
database. After a CAS credential is issued, if a set of privileges is deleted from a VO role
on the CAS server and/or the timing constraints on the role are changed then the
credentials have to be expired before the new policy takes effect on the resources. We
have not implemented mechanisms to revoke current credentials containing old policy
assertions. However, if the same set of privileges deleted from the VO role is also deleted
from each of the corresponding local roles, or the same changes to the timing constraints
are made, then the access to the resources can be restricted immediately based on the new
policy. The resource providers can use the local database management systems (DBMSs)
to update the privileges on the local database roles and modify the triggers to
accommodate the new timing constraints. The changes in the local policy information
also have to be made in the role-map files. Since the privileges and timing constraints on
the local database roles are enforced by the local DBMS itself, they will come into effect
immediately. If the client submits a query, but the query fails due to the new policy, then
the client can be notified via an error message. The client can request new credentials and
then restart the application.

If a VO role is updated independently of the corresponding local roles after the
credentials are issued, one way to restrict the access immediately is to have the CAS
server notify the GDSFs of the updates. This information can be passed on to the GDSs
and cached by the GDSFs for up to the maximum lifetime of the credential. Any
credential issued before the notification and containing an authorized VO role, which has
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been updated on the CAS server, can then be rejected. If a connection to the resource has
been already established based on that role, then it should be discontinued.

If the local policy is changed to deny the access of a particular Grid user after that
user has already been connected to the resource, then this new policy is not enforced
because the role-map file is not rechecked. One possible solution to enforce the new local
policy immediately is to notify the GDS every time the local policy information in the
role-map file is updated, so that the user identity and policy assertion in the CAS
credential can be checked against the local policy information.

With our method, a user who wants to perform the tasks associated with multiple
roles does not need to generate multiple CAS proxies. The user can just delegate a single
CAS credential containing all those roles. For example, a user may want to read from one
database in one role and write to another database in another role. In this case, a single
CAS credential containing both roles can be delegated, and then the user can be
authorized by each resource provider with respect to the corresponding role.

3.5 Performance Analysis
The existing implementation of the OGSA-DAI client has been modified to
delegate a CAS credential, and the server has been modified to obtain the user’s
capabilities present in the CAS credential. The overheads incurred with our
implementation are compared with those of the existing implementation of OGSA-DAI,
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which does not use the CAS credential. OGSA-DAI Release 4.0 was deployed on a
Jakarta Tomcat 5.0.27/Globus Toolkit 3.2.1 (GT3) stack running on a Linux machine
with a 2.6 GHz Intel Pentium IV processor and 1 GB of RAM. The littleblackbook
MySQL database table distributed with OGSA-DAI was used as a test database, and it
contains 10,000 tuples. The perform document consisting of a request for a single tuple
was used for the purpose of analysis.

3.5.1 Profiling Details
A Java method System.currentTimeMillis() is used to get the current system time in
milliseconds. Also, for the server-side analysis, the Apache Log4j logger, which logs
time to a log file in milliseconds, is used. For more accuracy, the tomcat container was
shutdown and restarted before each client request in order to minimize the caching effects
within GT3 and OGSA-DAI [49]. The main changes from the original configuration are
the way the mapping is done at the server-side and how the credential is delegated at the
client-side. So, only the security aspects of the client and the server are profiled and
analyzed. The following types of Grid Data Services are used in the analysis as in [49]:
1) Signature: GDS enforcing GSI Secure Conversation with Signature. This enforces
message integrity being established between the client and the server.
2) Encryption: GDS enforcing GSI Secure Conversation with Encryption. This enforces
message privacy being established.
3) None: GDS which does not enforce any security. The GDS does not provide a secure
conversation.
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3.5.2 Client-Side Security
A call is made to each of the above GDSs with and without using a CAS proxy
credential. In case of using a CAS proxy credential, an additional overhead for its
creation is incurred. In the performance analysis, we do not show this overhead because it
is incurred only once before the client contacts the GDSs. Thereafter, the client can
submit any number of queries before the CAS proxy credential expires. The lifetime of
the CAS proxy credential is equal to the time remaining for the expiration of the user
proxy credential, which can last up to 12 hours. The time taken for the creation of the
CAS proxy credential depends on several factors such as network bandwidth and
workload of the CAS server. In our system, the average time taken for the creation of a
CAS proxy credential is around 600 milliseconds.

The findServiceData method of a GDSF returns the information about its
corresponding data resource. Three consecutive calls to findServiceData are required:
The first call returns the database schema, the second returns the activities permitted, and
the third returns the product type (for example, the type of DBMS). The perform method
of a GDS takes the perform document, which contains the query, and returns the results
to the client. GSI Secure Conversation requires a security context to be established
between the client and the server. The overheads incurred in setting up this security
context are analyzed based on the following:
1.

Calls made for creating a credential object from the proxy credential.

2.

Calls to the findServiceData and perform methods.
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Figure 3.13: Client-Side Security
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Figure 3.14: Obtaining Service Data and Query Execution

The corresponding times are shown in Figure 3.13, and as observed, the time for
creating the credential object is almost the same regardless of the security enforced by the
GDS. In case of None, there is no such overhead as the credentials are not used. The first
call to the findServiceData takes longer than the subsequent calls because it includes the
initialization of the GDS regardless of the security type used. Figure 3.14 clearly shows
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the times taken for the subsequent calls to the findServiceData and the perform methods.
The times recorded in the case of using a CAS proxy credential and those without using a
CAS proxy credential are almost the same. The reason is because all the security
functions on the client-side remain unchanged except for the use of a CAS proxy
credential instead of a user proxy credential.
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Figure 3.15: Server-Side Security
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Figure 3.16: Security Overheads on the Server-Side
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Figure 3.17: Mapping and Database Connection

3.5.3 Server-Side Security
The analysis made on the server-side is based on the following:
1. The client credentials accessed using the GT3 infrastructure.
2. Extracting the VO role or Grid identity from the credential. If the VO role is extracted,
its capabilities are compared against the local policy.
3. Mapping a user to a database username and a password, and creating a JDBC
connection.
4. The perform operation.
As shown in Figure 3.15, the time for the credential extraction, which includes
policy comparison, is very small compared to the time for executing the perform
operation. The time for executing the perform operation remains constant for all the
GDSs. The perform operation is done only after the credential extraction process is
completed; and as a result, its execution time is not affected by the type of credential
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used. The credential extraction times are shown more clearly in Figure 3.16, and we can
see that the credential extraction takes more time when a CAS proxy credential is used
for contacting a GDS that enforces the secure conversation. An overhead is incurred
because of the time taken for obtaining the user identity and the policy assertion from the
CAS credential and then comparing it against the local policy in the role-map file.
However, this overhead is in the order of a few milliseconds and is insignificant
compared to the overall time taken for performing the client’s query. When a CAS proxy
credential is not used, the user proxy credential is used instead, and then the credential
extraction involves obtaining only the user identity. In case of contacting a nonsecure
GDS, since credentials are not used, there are no overheads incurred for credential
extraction.

Figure 3.17 shows that there is a constant overhead for mapping a user to a
database username and a password and then subsequently setting up the database
connection. The processes of mapping and connection are done after the credential
extraction process is completed; and as a result, their execution times are not affected by
the type of credential used. If there are a large number of entries in the role-map file, the
mapping would still not take much time because a hash table is used to store those
entries.

In summary, on the client-side, our method incurs small overheads in the security
setup as additional steps are involved for requesting and using the CAS credential.
However, as seen from the performance results, the time taken for the individual OGSA56

DAI method calls are the same whether a CAS credential is used for authorization or not.
This is because all the security functions remain unchanged, except for the use of a CAS
proxy credential instead of a user proxy credential. On the server-side, the additional
overheads incurred in our credential extraction process are very small compared to the
time taken for executing the client’s queries. These overheads in setting up the security
context are insignificant when we consider the benefits of our method, such as scalability
in managing VO policies and reduced administration overheads for resource providers.
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Chapter 4
RBAC with Shibboleth in the OGSADAI System
In the last chapter, we described how the Community Authorization Service (CAS)
[14] can be used to enhance the security mechanism in OGSA-DAI. However, a single
CAS server can be a bottleneck if a large number of users attempt to access it at the same
time, and it can be a single point of failure. Also, while our system provides security in
terms of access control, it does not provide privacy protection for the users because every
CAS credential contains information that identifies the user. In this chapter, we propose
for OGSA-DAI an RBAC system using Shibboleth, GridShib and the Object, Metadata
and Artifacts Registry (OMAR) [50]. OGSA-DAI has recently been linked with the Web
Services Resource Framework (WSRF). The newly defined OGSA-DAI Data Service can
be dynamically configured and can expose multiple data resources, which can be any
entity that acts as a source and/or a sink of data [13]. Shibboleth is designed to provide
user attributes to the resources for access control, and it mainly targets the internet-based
resources. In our system, it is also used as a Role Enablement Authority (REA), which is
responsible for assigning roles to users and for enabling roles within a user’s session [17].
OMAR provides an implementation of the OASIS e-business eXtensible Markup
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Language (ebXML) registry specifications. The ebXML registry specifications are
developed to achieve interoperable registries and repositories with an interface that
enables submission, query and retrieval [51].

Our system is scalable in terms of the number of access requests as well as the
number of users and VOs; and it is robust as there is no single point of failure. It supports
the management of roles and privileges; and also supports dynamic delegation of rights
via roles. It also supports fine-grain attribute release policy and provides privacy
protection for users within VOs that employ OGSA-DAI. Furthermore, similar to the
previous system it can support a wide range of security policies using role-privileges, role
hierarchies, delegations, and constraints. Resource providers need to maintain only the
mapping information from VO roles to local roles and local policies, thus their
administration overhead is reduced. When users join/leave a VO, the resource providers
do not have to bother about individually adding/removing their information in the rolemap files, because OMAR can be used to directly grant/revoke their memberships on the
VO roles. Moreover, the resource providers can permit or deny the access requests of
specific users by maintaining their authorization information separately. This enables the
resource providers to have the ultimate authority over their resources. Also, unnecessary
mapping and connections can be avoided by denying invalid requests at the VO level.

We have implemented our proposed system and analyzed its performance. The
server-side of OGSA-DAI has been configured to use Shibboleth through GridShib. The
GridShib software provides two interfaces, one for the Grid services and the other for
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Shibboleth [33]. The OGSA-DAI server has been modified to obtain the user’s attributes
from the Shibboleth service, verify them against the local policies, and map the user to a
local role based on the role-map file. The role-map file has been extended to include the
mapping from a VO role to a local role. Our performance analysis shows that the
proposed system incurs a small overhead in setting up the security context between the
client and server. This overhead is quite acceptable when we consider the benefits of our
system, such as scalability in managing VO policies and reduced administration overhead
for resource providers.

The organization of the chapter is as follows: In Section 4.1, we propose a RBAC
system with Shibboleth and GridShib in OGSA-DAI. In Section 4.2, we show how to
manage VO policies using XACML and OMAR. Section 4.3 describes the results of
performance analysis.

4.1 Architecture of the RBAC System Using Shibboleth
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Figure 4.1: Accessing a data resource using GridShib and Shibboleth
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Shibboleth
Service

Each site participating in the Grid maintains its own attribute space and Shibboleth
service. The GridShib software provides two interfaces, one for the Grid services and the
other for Shibboleth. Shibboleth and GridShib support the pull model in which a target
resource (a) authenticates a user by using the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) of
Globus Toolkit [14]; (b) determines the address of the appropriate Shibboleth service in
the process; and (c) obtains the selected user attributes (that the resource is authorized to
see) from the Shibboleth service [33].

In our system, as shown in Figure 4.1, the GridShib-Shibboleth interface and the
Shibboleth service together function as the Policy Information Point (PIP) and RoleEnablement Authority (REA). A PIP releases attribute values related to the subject (such
as a user, application or Grid service), the resource and the environment. A REA is
responsible for assigning roles to users and for enabling roles within a user’s session [17].
Attributes are released in order to authorize users not only based on their entitlements and
affiliations, but also based on their requested roles, role memberships and user
credentials. The user credential is formed by an X.509 certificate and the associated
public/private keys, and is issued by a Certificate Authority (CA) trusted by all entities in
a Grid [44].

The user submits a request to the OGSA-DAI Data Service, and it retrieves the
user’s roles and attributes from the PIP/REA (i.e., GridShib-Shibboleth interface and the
Shibboleth service) based on the user’s identity. The GridShib interface for the OGSADAI Data Service functions as the Policy Decision Point (PDP) and returns the
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authorization decision, such as “permit” or “deny”, to the requesting Data Service. The
request is evaluated based on the attributes released by the PIP/REA and the attributes of
the local policies maintained by the Data Service. The OGSA-DAI Data Service
functions as a Policy Administration Point (PAP) at the local level and also as a Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP). A PAP manages the policies and policy sets, and makes them
available to the PDP (i.e., the GridShib interface for the OGSA-DAI Data Service). A
PEP executes the decision of the PDP by either performing or denying the client’s
request. If the decision is “permit”, the PEP (OGSA-DAI Data Service) sets the security
context based on the user’s role, and then a connection is established between the Data
Service and the requested data resource. The user can then submit queries to the Data
Service and obtain the results. If the decision is “deny”, then an error message is returned
to the user, indicating that the user is not authorized to perform the operation. PIP, PDP,
PAP, and PEP are terms used in the XACML authorization model [18].

The attribute space at each site, shown in Figure 4.1, is composed of the attributes
related to the subject, the resource and the environment; and can also hold the attributes
pertaining to VO policies. Shibboleth does not store or manage attributes, so a data store,
such as a Lightweight Directory Access protocol (LDAP) directory or a database, is
required. We propose the use of OMAR as the PAP at the VO level to administrate the
portion of the attribute space pertaining to VO policies at the individual sites. This is
explained in the following section.
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4.2 Managing VO Policies Using XACML and OMAR
In order to specify VO policies in the form of VO roles, role hierarchies, privileges
and constraints, we used the Core and Hierarchical RBAC profile of XACML. We also
used OMAR for the storage and distributed administration of the VO policies.
Specification of policies at the VO level allows authorization decisions to be made based
on the user’s request and VO policies. In case the user does not possess the required
privileges, the access can be denied at the VO level. This eliminates mapping and
connection overheads on the resource providers in case the request is not valid.

4.2.1 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
XACML is an OASIS standard for describing access control policies uniformly
across different security domains [18]. XACML defines the following main components
to represent policies:
(1) A <PolicySet> contains a set of access control policies or other policy sets.
(2) A <Policy> represents an access control policy described through a set of rules.
(3) A <Rule> represents an access rule or permission.
An XACML <PolicySet>, <Policy> and <Rule> may contain a <Target> element. A
<Target> element specifies the set of subjects, resources, actions and environments to
which the <PolicySet>, <Policy> and <Rule> applies [18]. The Core and Hierarchical
RBAC profile of XACML specification defines how ANSI core and hierarchical RBAC
standard [19] can be specified in XACML. The Core and Hierarchical profile further
defines the following components:
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(1) Permission <PolicySet> (PPS) contains <Policy> elements and <Rules> associated
with a given role. A PPS may also contain references to other PPSs associated with other
roles that are junior to the given role, thereby allowing the role to inherit all the
permissions associated with its junior roles. The <Policy> elements and <Rules> of the
PPS describe the resources and the permissions on the resources along with any
conditions on those permissions.
(2) Role <PolicySet> (RPS) associates a role with the corresponding PPS. Each RPS can
only refer to a single PPS.
(3) Role Assignment <Policy> (or <PolicySet>) defines which roles can be enabled or
assigned to which subjects.

4.2.2 Specifying VO Policies Using XACML
In this section, we explain how the VO policies can be expressed with the Core and
Hierarchical RBAC profile of XACML. For example, consider a VO Alpha which could
be a project undertaken by collaborating organizations. Assume that the VO uses two
roles: manager and employee. An employee has permission to read the data from a
database only from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM. The manager has all the permissions of the
employee, and additionally has permission to update the database. The manager role is
therefore senior to the employee role. In multi-domain environments such as VOs, it is
necessary to manage the attributes across different domains and is often needed to
aggregate the attributes for making authorization decisions. For this purpose, it is
necessary to distinguish the VO’s attributes from local attributes and also from attributes
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of other VOs. For example, the employee role in the Accounting subgroup of Alpha may
have different permissions from the employee role in the Accounting subgroup of Beta,
where Beta is another VO. Hence, when making an authorization decision, it is not only
important to know the role name employee but also the VO name, either Alpha or Beta.
In order to manage and identify attributes from different domains, Shibboleth uses
scoped attributes defined in SAML, which can include the domain name. A scoped
attribute is a combination of a value and its scope. Scope identifies the domains and subdomains in which the values are defined. For example, a scoped attribute may be
“faculty@abcuniv.edu”, which identifies the value “faculty” in the scope “abcuniv.edu”.
However, the XACML profile does not support these scoped attribute values for subjects
such as roles. Mapping SAML to XACML allows the systems using XACML to store
SAML attributes [62].

<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicySetId="RPS:employee:role"
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-overrides">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId="&function;anyURI-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;anyURI" Scope="Alpha.Accounting">&roles;employee</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&role;" DataType="&xml;anyURI"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject>
</Subjects>
</Target>
<PolicySetIdReference>PPS:employee:role</PolicySetIdReference>
</PolicySet>

Figure 4.2: RPS of the employee role

We show how the scoped attribute values can be specified in the RBAC profile of
XACML to represent role names specific to VOs and VO subgroups. For example, the
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employee role in the Accounting subgroup of Alpha can be represented in XACML as
shown in Figure 4.2 which illustrates the RPS for this role. The VO and subgroup names
“Alpha.Accounting” represent the scope of the employee role. The RPS of the employee
role references the PPS of the employee role via <PolicySetIdReference>. The PPS of the
employee role is shown in Figure 4.3, where the resource is represented in a hierarchical
form. The RPS of the manager role is not shown here, but is similar to the RPS of
employee except that the role name is manager and the <PolicySetIdReference>
references the PPS:manager:role shown in Figure 4.4.

In order to support fine-grain authorization for resources, where access control can
be specified not only for the entire resource (e.g. database) but also for its components
(e.g. table), the hierarchical resource profile of XACML [53] can be used. This profile
specifies how XACML provides access control for resources that are organized as a
hierarchy, such as file systems, XML documents, and databases. For example, for nonXML

data,

the

profile

specifies

the

URI

of

the

following

form:

<scheme>://<authority>/<pathname> where <pathname> is of the form <root name>
{/<node name>}, and <scheme> identifies the namespace of the URI and may further
restrict the syntax and semantics of identifiers using that scheme. The scheme can be a
protocol such as “ftp” or “http”, and a file system resource can have “file” as the scheme.
<authority> is typically defined by an Internet-based server or a scheme-specific registry
of naming authorities, such as DNS. The sequence of <root name> and <node name>
values should correspond to the components in a hierarchical resource. For example,
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“https://localhost:8484/ogsadai/DataService/Employee” indicates the Employee table in
the database represented by the specified URI.

<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicySetId="PPS:employee:role"
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-overrides">
<Policy PolicyId="Permissions:specifically:for:the:employee:role" RuleCombiningAlgId="&rule-combine;permit-overrides">
<Rule RuleId="Permission:to:read:data:from:employee:table" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Resources>
<Resource>
<ResourceMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">https://localhost:8484/ogsadai/DataService/Employee</AttributeValue>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&resource;resource-id" DataType="&xml;string"/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
</Resources>
<Actions>
<Action>
<ActionMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">select</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&action;action-id" DataType="&xml;string"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action>
</Actions>
</Target>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="&function;and">
<Apply FunctionId="&function;time-greater-than-or-equal">
<Apply FunctionId="&function;time-one-and-only">
<EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&environment;current-time" DataType="&xml;time"/>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;time">9h</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
<Apply FunctionId="&function;time-less-than-or-equal">
<Apply FunctionId="&function;time-one-and-only">
<EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&environment;current-time" DataType="&xml;time"/>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;time">17h</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
</Policy>
</PolicySet>
</PolicySet>

Figure 4.3: PPS of the employee role

The PPS of the employee role shown in Figure 4.3 grants the permission to execute
the SELECT operation (specified within <Action>) on the resource identified by the URI
“https://localhost:8484/ogsadai/DataService/Employee” (specified within <Resource>)
only from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM (specified within <Condition>). Obviously, not only the
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basic database operations, but also complex operations, such as transactions and stored
procedures, can be permitted. The PPS of the manager role shown in Figure 4.4 grants the
permission to execute the UPDATE operation on the Employee table. It references the
PPS of the employee role via <PolicySetIdReference>, thereby inherits all the
permissions of the employee role.

<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicySetId="PPS:manager:role"
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-overrides">
<Policy PolicyId="Permissions:specifically:for:the:manager:role" RuleCombiningAlgId="&rule-combine;permit-overrides">
<Rule RuleId="Permission:to:update:data:from:employee:table" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Resources>
<Resource>
<ResourceMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">https://localhost:8484/ogsadai/DataService/Employee</AttributeValue>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&resource;resource-id" DataType="&xml;string"/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
</Resources>
<Actions>
<Action>
<ActionMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">update</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&action;action-id" DataType="&xml;string"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action>
<Actions>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>
<PolicySetIdReference>PPS:employee:role</PolicySetIdReference>
</PolicySet>

Figure 4.4: PPS of the manager role

4.2.3 Object, Metadata and Artifacts Registry (OMAR)
For storing and managing the XACML policies, we make use of the Object,
Metadata and Artifacts Registry (OMAR) which provides an implementation of the
OASIS ebXML registry specifications. The ebXML specifications are developed to
achieve interoperable registries and repositories, with an interface that enables
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submission, query and retrieval of the registry and repository contents [51]. An ebXML
registry is an information system that securely manages any content type and the
standardized metadata that describes the content. It also provides a set of services for the
sharing of its content and metadata between organizational entities in a federated
environment [54].
OMAR stores data in a repository and stores the associated metadata as registry
objects [54]. The relationship between the registry objects is represented by an
association object. OMAR allows many-to-many associations between the registry
objects. OMAR uses an object, called slot, to add attributes dynamically to registry
objects.

OMAR stores the XACML policies in their entirety as repository items and
classifies them as either XACML Policy object or XACML PolicySet object. However,
as policies are stored in their entirety, any updates in policies become difficult especially
for VOs whose policies are complex and tend to change dynamically. To solve this
problem, we propose to split each policy into components and store them as different
objects, as described below.

4.2.4 Managing the RBAC Policies in XACML Using OMAR
OMAR allows the creation of new objects and their classification. The information
pertaining to these objects is stored in a relational database. A Role <PolicySet> (RPS) is
represented in XACML as shown in Figure 4.5(a). In OMAR, we represent a
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<PolicySet> as an XACML PolicySet object with the <PolicySetId> attribute value used
as the object’s name. The other attributes of the <PolicySet> are represented as slots. For
the other components, such as <Target> and <Subjects>, we create new objects, as shown
in Figure 4.5(c).
Id:1273123
ObjectType: PolicySet
Name:RPS:employee:role
Slots:
Name: PolicyCombiningAlgId
Value: &policy-combine;permit-overrides

<PolicySet
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"
PolicySetId="RPS:employee:role"
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permitoverrides">
<Target>
<Subjects>
………..… &roles;employee …………
</Subjects>
</Target>
<PolicySetIdReference>
PPS:employee:role
</PolicySetIdReference>
</PolicySet>

Id: 456
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType:PolicySetIdReference
Id: 234
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType: Contains

(a) Role <PolicySet> in XACML
Id

…..

sourceId

TargetId

234

Association
Type
Contains

1273123

3874583

345

Contains

3874583

3243454

456

PolicySetId
Reference

1273123

1253123

PPS

Id:3874583
ObjectType: Target
Id: 3243454
ObjectType: Subjects

Id: 345
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType: Contains

Id: 7234263
ObjectType: String
Name:&roles;employee

(b) Associations between objects in OMAR

(c) Role <PolicySet> stored as objects in OMAR

Figure 4.5: A part of the employee RPS in XACML and corresponding storage in OMAR

The role name is stored as a String object. To represent the relationship between
the various components, we use the associations, such as ‘Contains’, which are defined
by OMAR. In addition, we create a new association ‘PolicySetIdReference’ to represent
the association between a Role <PolicySet> and a Permission <PolicySet> (PPS). The
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associations between the various objects are captured in a relational table as shown in
Figure 4.5(b). For example, the association between a PolicySet object and a Target
object is stored as a tuple with Id ‘234’. A representation of a PPS in XACML and it
corresponding storage in OMAR are shown in Figure 4.6.

<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicySetId="PPS:employee:role"
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-overrides">
<Policy PolicyId="Permissions:specifically:for:the:employee:role" RuleCombiningAlgId="&rule-combine;permit-overrides">
<Rule RuleId="Permission:to:perform:action2:on:resource2" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Resources>….resource2… </Resources>
<Actions>…action2… </Actions>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>
</PolicySet>

Id:1253123
ObjectType: PolicySet
Name:PPS:employee:role
Slots:
Name: PolicyCombiningAlgId
Value: &policy-combine;permit-overrides

RPS

Id: 456
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType:Contains

Id: 2398474
ObjectType: Policy
Name: Permissions:specifically:for:the:employee:role
Slots:
Name: RuleCombiningAlgId
Value: &rule-combine;permit-overrides

Id: 256
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType:Contains

Id:2837429
ObjectType: Rule
Name:Permission:to:perform:action2:on:resource2
Slots:
Name: Effect
Value: permit

Id: 565
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType:Contains
Id:5675677
ObjectType: Target

Id: 3256444
ObjectType: Resources

Id:789
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType: Contains

Id: 4356575
ObjectType: String
Name: resource2

Id: 878
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType: Contains

Id: 3256444
ObjectType: Actions

Id: 4565675
ObjectType: String
Name: action2

Figure 4.6: A part of the employee PPS in XACML and corresponding storage in OMAR
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OMAR supports the federation of registries by defining a federation object and the
association between the registry objects and the federation object. Federation allows
multiple registries to link together seamlessly and appear as a single logical registry,
while retaining local autonomy and security. Thus, XACML-based policies can be stored
and managed across multiple sites in the Grid, while each site maintains its own registry
and Shibboleth service. Hence, there is less potential for bottlenecks and no single point
of failure in the system as authorization queries are distributed among the Shibboleth
services. OMAR provides a Java browser user interface and a Web user interface for
managing the registry objects and repository items. It also provides an API for creating
new objects and associations. The XACML-based policies can be easily managed
through this API since all the policy information is stored in relational databases. Figure
4.7 shows the policy objects in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 in a Java browser, and Figure 4.8
shows how the attributes and their values of the PolicySet object in Figure 4.6 are stored
using slots in OMAR.

4.2.5 User-Role Assignments
The RBAC profile of XACML allows the specification of constraints on specific
user-role assignments through the Role Assignment <Policy>/<PolicySet>, but it does
not maintain the roles assigned to each user. The user-role assignments are typically
made by an identity provider at each site by adding the roles to a user’s attribute list. The
identity provider can release the attributes of the users to the resource providers so that
access control decisions can be made.
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Figure 4.7: Policy objects of the employee role and their associations stored in OMAR

Figure 4.8: Details of the PPS:employee:role object in Figure 4.6 as stored in OMAR
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In a VO, the user attributes may have to be managed across multiple sites, and in
that case a portion of the attribute space at each of those sites should be delegated to the
VO. This can be supported by Signet [55] which is a privilege management system being
developed by a working group of the Internet2 Middleware Initiative for the distributed
administration of privileges. By interfacing Signet to the Shibboleth and enabling the user
access through GridShib, we can delegate the management of a portion of an attribute
space at a site [33].

The VO can then make the role assignments at each site for the users who are VO
members. However, the Grid identity of the user has to be mapped to a local identity in
order to retrieve the attributes of the user from the attribute space of the site. The
GridShib interface for Shibboleth handles this mapping by maintaining a text file that
maps the Grid identity of a user to a local identity. However, this method is not scalable
as the mapping information should be maintained for each user. In our system, roles are
assigned to the user’s Grid identity, and it can be done within OMAR itself. A registry
object is created for each user, and it contains the user’s Grid identity. The “HasMember”
association is specified between the RPS object of the role and the user object as shown
in Figure 4.7, thus allowing the REA in our system to enable the user’s role.

Moreover, since Shibboleth can be interfaced to local data stores, like LDAP
directories and databases, providing user attributes, the VO can delegate the user-role
assignments to individual sites. The sites can assign certain VO roles to local users based
on their attributes. For example, only the employees of a particular department can be
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given a membership on the role VO-guest. The REA in our system can also make userrole assignments dynamically. For example, students enrolled in a particular course can
be given a membership on the role VO-student, based on their user attributes in the local
data stores and the Role Assignment <Policy>/<PolicySet> registry objects.

4.2.6

Administration of

RBAC Policies and

Dynamic

Delegation of Rights with OMAR
One of the key features of RBAC is the ability to manage itself through
administrative roles and permissions [10]. Users in administrative roles can create roles
and role hierarchies; make user-role and permission-role assignments; and specify
constraints. Furthermore, they can assign administration privileges to other users. This
administration feature of RBAC is not directly addressed by the RBAC profile of
XACML, but can be easily realized through OMAR.

A user with OMAR registry administration privileges can create policy objects and
determine how other registry users can access them through the Access Control Policy
(ACP) file. In particular, that user can create a registry role (by creating policy objects)
and assign privileges for creating/accessing certain registry objects to that role. A registry
role is an OMAR component similar to a database role. The user who creates a registry
role can also grant memberships on that registry role to other registry users. For example,
a VO administrator having OMAR registry administration privileges can create a new
registry role and assign (to that role) only the privilege to create users in VO employee
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role. The VO administrator can then assign a VO manager to the new registry role (after
creating a registry account for the VO manager). Then, the VO manager can create new
users in VO employee role by himself/herself.

The RBAC profile of XACML does not address dynamic delegation of rights,
which is important in Grids. A user should be able to dynamically delegate his/her rights
to other users, applications and Grid services without administrative intervention. For
example, a VO supervisor with access rights to a new resource may wish to delegate
his/her rights to applications run by certain users. The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI)
of the Globus Toolkit achieves such delegation through the use of temporary proxy
credentials which are generated based on user credentials [44]. However, it does not
allow the specification of constraints on the delegation of rights. For example, a VO
supervisor may be allowed to delegate his/her rights only to programmers, but not to
operators. Such constrained dynamic delegation can be easily achieved with OMAR. The
VO supervisor can be assigned to a registry role that allows him/her to only create policy
objects representing a new VO role, but not to create user objects. The VO supervisor can
also be allowed to create associations only between the PPS object of the new VO role
and the PPS object of the VO supervisor role. This allows the delegation of privileges
from the supervisor role to the new VO role. Furthermore, the VO supervisor can be
allowed to create associations only between the RPS of the new VO role and the user
objects associated with the RPS of the VO programmer role. This allows only VO
programmers to be assigned to the new VO role. Thus, the VO supervisor can delegate its
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own privileges only to VO programmers, whose applications can then access the new
resource as soon as the new VO role is enabled by the REA.

4.3 Performance Analysis
We have implemented the proposed RBAC system and integrated it with OGSADAI. We have configured the server-side of OGSA-DAI to use Shibboleth through
GridShib. The OGSA-DAI server has been modified to obtain the user’s attributes from
the Shibboleth service, verify them against the local policy, and map the user’s VO role
to a local role by using the role-map file. The role-map file has been extended to include
the mapping from a VO role to a local role. Furthermore, the resource providers can grant
or refuse the access requests of specific users by maintaining their authorization
information separately in the Access Control List (ACL) maintained by the OGSA-DAI
server. This enables the resource providers to have the ultimate authority over their
resources. The Shibboleth service has been modified to use a custom data connector for
the retrieval of the user’s attributes based on his/her Grid identity from OMAR.

The overheads incurred with our RBAC system are compared with those of the
existing authorization infrastructure of OGSA-DAI. In our system, OGSA-DAI WSRF
Release 2.0 was deployed in the Globus Toolkit 4.0.1 container running on a Linux
machine with a 2.6 GHz Intel Pentium IV processor and 1 GB of RAM. Shibboleth identity
provider (IdP) 1.3c was configured to run on SSL-enabled Apache 2.2.0 and Tomcat 5.0.28
servers. We used OMAR 3.0 beta 1 as the repository for storing the XACML policies. The
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littleblackbook MySQL database table distributed with OGSA-DAI was used as a test
database, and it contains 10,000 tuples. The perform document consisting of a request for a
single tuple was used for the purpose of analysis.

4.3.1 Profiling Details
A Java method System.currentTimeMillis() is used to get the current system time in
milliseconds. Also, for the server-side analysis, the Apache Log4j logger, which logs
time to a log file in milliseconds, is used. For more accuracy, the tomcat, apache and
Globus toolkit containers are shutdown and restarted before each client request, in order
to minimize the caching effects within Globus Toolkit, OGSA-DAI and Shibboleth
server. The main change from the original configuration of OGSA-DAI is the way
authorization is performed at the server-side. Hence, only the security aspects of the
client and the server are profiled and analyzed.

Globus Toolkit uses Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) which allows two levels of
security: transport-level and message-level. In the transport-level security, the complete
communication channel between the client and server is encrypted. In the message-level
security, only the message is encrypted, so it has the flexibility that the message can be
transmitted over any transport. The message-level security offers more features than the
transport-level security, but it takes more time. The performance is analyzed based on
these different levels of security established between the client and the server as shown
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below. For each of these levels, we recorded the times taken with and without using
Shibboleth.
1) MLS: Enforces GSI Secure Conversation between the client and the server of
OGSA-DAI with message-level security and privacy.
2) TLS: Enforces GSI Secure Conversation between the client and the server of
OGSA-DAI with transport-level security and privacy.
3) None: Does not provide a secure conversation between the client and the server of
OGSA-DAI and does not enforce any security.

4.3.2 Client-Side Security
A call is made to each of the above OGSA-DAI Data Services with and without
using Shibboleth. In case of using Shibboleth, additional overhead exists for contacting
the Shibboleth service, retrieving user attributes, and verifying the validity of the attribute
assertions. The getversion method of the Data Service returns the version of OGSA-DAI
used. The listResources method of the Data Service returns the list of resources hosted by
the Data Service. The perform method of the Data Service takes the perform document,
which contains the query, and returns the result to the client.

GSI Secure Conversation requires a security context to be established between
the client and the server. The overheads incurred in setting up this security context are
analyzed based on the following:
1. A call made to manage the communication with the configurable Data Service.
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2. Calls to the getversion, listResources and perform methods.
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Figure 4.9: Client-Side Security

The corresponding times are shown in Figure 4.9, and as observed, the time for
creating the proxy which manages the communication with the configurable data service
is almost the same. This process involves connecting to the service at the given URL,
retrieving its information, and determining the specification of web services used for the
OGSA-DAI distribution. As this step does not require any authorization, it takes almost
the same time regardless of the security enforced by the Data Service. The calls to the
getversion, listResources and perform take longer when Shibboleth is used because the
server has to contact it, retrieve the user information, and verify whether the user is
authorized to perform the requested operation. In case of None, it takes less time because
there is no such authorization overhead.
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The times for executing the getversion method are longer compared with other
methods, because it is the first call made by the client and takes time to retrieve the user
attributes from the Shibboleth service. The later calls take less time as they may require
the same attributes that are obtained previously and cached by the GridShib interface for
the Data Service.

4.3.3 Server-Side Security
The analysis made on the server-side is based on the following:
1. Times taken for retrieving user attributes from the Shibboleth service during the
getVersion, listResources and perform method calls.
2. Time to establish the JDBC connection.
3. A call to the getSecurityContext method which returns the security related information.

Figure 4.10 shows the times taken for retrieving the attribute information during
the getVersion, listResources and perform method calls. The GridShib interface for the
Data Service can cache received attributes from call to call, which allows multiple
methods to be executed by the same client without making repeated callouts to the
attribute authority. Hence, the attribute retrieval from Shibboleth during the getVersion
method call involves contacting the attribute authority and takes longer time than
subsequent method calls which can use the cached user attributes. When Shibboleth is not
used, this overhead is not incurred as attribute retrieval is not performed.
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Figure 4.10: Server-Side Security
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Figure 4.11: Database Connection

Figure 4.11 shows the time taken for setting up the database connection between
the server and the resource. As no authorization is required, this step takes almost the
same time regardless of the security enforced by the Data Service. Figure 4.12 shows the
time taken for obtaining the security related information on the server-side. In this step,
obtaining the user credential and extracting the identity of the user can be done only
when the GSI Secure Conversation is used. In case of None, the overhead is bigger
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because of the unsuccessful attempts made to retrieve the credential and the identity of
the user.
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Figure 4.12: Retrieval of Security Context

In summary, on the client-side and server-side, additional overheads exist when
setting up the security context because the server contacts the Shibboleth service,
retrieves user attributes, and verifies the validity of the attribute assertions in order to
authorize the client. The client can execute multiple methods without repeated callouts
being made to the attribute authority by the server. This is because the GridShib interface
for the Data Service can cache received attributes and those same attributes may be
required for subsequent method calls. On the server-side, no additional overheads are
incurred in the credential extraction process and setting up of the database connection, as
no authorization is required during these steps. The overheads in setting up the security
context are quite acceptable when we consider the benefits of our method, such as
scalability in managing VO policies and reduced administration overheads for resource
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providers. For multiple large queries, this overhead is almost negligible compared to the
execution time of the perform document.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this research, we enhanced the role-based access control (RBAC) mechanism of
OGSA-DAI by using (1) the Community Authorization Service (CAS), and (2) the
Shibboleth, GridShib, XACML and OMAR, so that users are granted memberships
statically and dynamically on virtual organization (VO) roles for Grid database services.
Interoperability between different security mechanisms, dynamic delegation of rights,
privacy protection, and the centralized and distributed management of privileges are
supported. The resource providers need to maintain only the mapping information from
VO roles to local database roles and the local policy information; thus, the number of
entries to be managed in the role-map file is reduced dramatically compared to the case
of using the identity-based mapping. The specification of policies at the VO level
eliminates unnecessary authentication, mapping and connections by denying invalid
requests at the VO level itself. When users join/leave a VO, the resource providers do not
need to add/remove their information individually in the role-map files because we can
just grant/revoke their memberships on VO roles. Furthermore, the resource providers
can grant or refuse the access requests of specific users by maintaining their authorization
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information separately in the role-map files. This enables the resource providers to have
the ultimate authority over their resources.

Our performance analysis shows that the proposed RBAC systems incur a small
overhead in setting up the security context between the client and server. However, this
overhead is quite acceptable when we consider the benefits of our system, such as the
scalability in terms of the number of users and VOs and reduced administration
overheads of resource providers. For multiple large queries, this overhead is almost
negligible compared to the execution time of the perform document.
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